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ABSTRACT
Employers Associations, Industry-wide Unions, and Competition
by Paul Heidhues*
This paper investigates the effects of industry-wide unions and employers associations in a
duopolistic industry. Using an efficient bargaining model, we show that it is profitable for
workers to form an industry union if firms produce goods that are substitutes. In our model
industry-wide unionization raises serious antitrust issues since it leads to a monopolistic prod-
uct market outcome - regardless of whether bargaining is centralized or not. Firms respond to
an industry union by forming an employers association to increase their bargaining power. If
firms productivity differences are relatively small or their products relatively heterogeneous,
employers associations have distributional but not efficiency consequences. If, however, pro-
ductivity differences between firms are relatively large and their products are relatively
homogeneous, employers associations may further reduce welfare.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Arbeitgeberverbände, Industriegewerkschaften und Wettbewerb
Dieser Beitrag untersucht die ökonomischen Auswirkungen von Industriegewerkschaften und
Arbeitgeberverbänden in einer duopolistischen Industrie. Anhand eines effizienten Verhand-
lungsmodells zeigen wir, dass es sich für Arbeitnehmer lohnt, eine Industriegewerkschaft zu
gründen, wenn die Unternehmen substituierbare Güter herstellen. Die Bildung einer Industrie-
gewerkschaft ist aus wettbewerbspolitischer Sicht jedoch höchst bedenklich, da sie zu einer
Monopolisierung des Produktmarktes führt  unabhängig davon, ob Lohnverhandlungen
zentral oder dezentral durchgeführt werden. In unserem Modell ist es für die Unternehmen
optimal, auf eine Industriegewerkschaft mit der Gründung eines Arbeitgeberverbandes zu
reagieren, weil das die Verhandlungsmacht gegenüber der Gewerkschaft erhöht. Wenn die
Produktivitätsunterschiede zwischen den Firmen relativ klein sind oder die Firmen sehr
heterogene Produkte produzieren, beeinflussen Arbeitgeberverbände zwar die Verteilung,
aber nicht die Höhe der Industrierente. Arbeitgeberverbände können die gesamtwirtschaft-
liche Wohlfahrt senken, wenn die Produktivitätsunterschiede zwischen den Unternehmen
groß und die Produkte relativ homogen sind.
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1.  Introduction
Centralized bargaining is a widespread phenomenon observable in most European labor mar-
kets. In Germany, as in many other European countries, politicians and economists are scrutiniz-
ing this phenomenon as they devise methods to combat unemployment. To understand the 
implications of centralized bargaining, we propose investigating both parties involved. While 
there is a considerable body of literature on union formation,1 employers’ associations have for 
the most part been ignored by economists.2 
This paper attempts to explain the raison d’etre and the effects of both unions and employers’ 
associations. We investigate not only how these associations affect labor market bargaining in oli-
gopolistic industries, but also how the formation of these associations affects the behavior of 
firms on the product market. Whenever competing firms meet to coordinate certain aspects of 
their behavior, there is a lurking fear that they will use such meetings to curtail competition in 
other stages of their interaction. We analyze how unions and employers’ associations affect the 
production decisions within an oligopolistic industry. From a policy perspective, this enables us to 
address the question of whether labor market associations should be exempt from antitrust laws.
 Consider Germany as a topical example. Historically, industry-wide employers’ associations 
formed around the turn of the century in response to the newly founded industry unions. At 
present, industry-wide bargaining between a union and an employers’ association is observed in 
most German industries.3 As a constitutional principle, the state has no right to interfere in labor 
1. See, for example, Davidson (1988), Horn and Wolinsky (1988a, 1988b), Jun (1989), and Stole and Zwie-
bel (1996). For a survey on wage bargaining models see Manzini (1998).
2. A reader studying, for example, the “Handbook of Labor Economics” will find no reference to employ-
ers’ associations.
3. According to German labor economics textbooks there is a broad consensus that about 80 percent of the 
German workforce is employed in firms that are members of an employers’ association. See, for exam-
ple, Keller (1997) and Franz (1996).
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disputes. Hence, it is natural to analyze labor disputes in a bargaining framework. Furthermore, 
with few exceptions, bargaining outcomes between the unions and the employers’ association are 
only binding for the members of the employers’ association.4 Because in Germany, as in many 
other countries, unions and employers’ associations are exempt from antitrust laws, firms are free 
to choose whether to enter (or exit) an employers’ association.5 Thus, from a modeling perspec-
tive, membership in an employers’ association must be individually rational. 
For the most part, the existing literature on labor negotiations in oligopolistic industries has 
applied the right-to-manage model in which firms and unions bargain over wages only. In con-
trast, this paper investigates how different bargaining institutions in the input market affect strate-
gic product market competition in an efficient bargaining model. One contribution of our paper is 
to clarify the implications of efficient bargaining for the relation between input and output market 
structure in the presence of an industry-wide union.6 In particular, our analysis shows that the cur-
rent empirical approaches used to test whether labor market bargaining is efficient are inappropri-
ate if unions are formed on an industry rather than a firm-level basis.
Considering the case of a single industry-wide union that is bargaining separately with each 
firm in the industry,7 we show that efficient bargaining implies that firms will noncooperatively 
choose to produce the monopoly quantity on the output market, even if an employers’ association 
does not exist.8 An implication of the analysis is that, in contrast to firm-level unions, the exemp-
4. Usually collective wage contracts only bind the employers and employers’ associations that negotiated 
the contract. If certain restrictive conditions are met, however, the Ministry of Labor can make agree-
ments generally binding by an extension rule, the so called AVE. See Haucap et al. (1999) for analysis of 
wage bargaining in the presence of generally binding wage agreements.
5. For a detailed overview of the laws governing centralized bargaining in Germany see Drescher (1993).
6. Dorwick (1989) investigates an efficient firm-level bargaining model within an oligopolistic industry. He 
conjectures that union coordination on wages does not affect the industry outcome. He does not, however, 
investigate the ability of firms to use unions in order to change the nature of product market competition.
7. This case has been studied extensively in a right-to-manage environment. See, for example, Davidson 
(1988), Dobson (1994), and Horn and Wolinsky (1988b).
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tion of industry-wide unions from antitrust laws reduces welfare in the efficient bargaining case 
by abolishing effective product market competition.
We solve the industry union’s bargaining problems - in the absence of an employers’ associa-
tion - using an extension of the Nash solution, which following Jun (1989) may be interpreted as 
the unique subgame perfect outcome of a Rubinstein-type alternating-offer model. The proposed 
bargaining solution can be implemented by a pair of contracts specifying the workers’ wage and a 
minimum employment level for each firm.
We then introduce an employers’ association as a collection of independent firms that negoti-
ate labor contracts jointly. A firm is said to be independent if it has to realize its profits on the out-
put market and can not rely on side payments from fellow members. We propose that this is an 
intuitively plausible way to distinguish an employers’ association from a merger. In our model, 
forming an employers’ association increases the set of agreements that lie in the core. Thereby, it 
affects the size of the pie players are bargaining over, which puts the members of an employers’ 
association in a stronger bargaining position. The main result of this paper is that it is profitable 
for competing firms to respond to an industry union by forming an employers’ association, 
regardless of their productivity differences.9 Our analysis also shows that this countervailing 
power move may be welfare reducing.
From a modeling point of view, we introduce an employers’ association as a coalition of 
firms that is bargaining jointly. As in Chae and Heidhues (1999), we aggregate the coalition’s 
8. Boughin and Vannini (1996) make a similar observation in the case of fully centralized bargaining. They 
do not, however, consider the case of decentralized bargaining in the presence of an industry-wide union.
9. We find it intuitively plausible that firms form an employers’ association to increase their bargaining 
power vis-a-vis an industry union. Interestingly, however, this is not the case if one uses a right-to-man-
age framework; indeed, in the right-to-manage version of our model, forming an employers’ association 
between symmetric and competing firms will increase wages. 
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preferences from its members’ preferences by an internal contract. The aggregation approach 
used in the current paper differs from Chae and Heidhues (1999) in that an employers’ associa-
tion, in contrast to a merger, is not allowed to engage in side payments. If the productivity differ-
ences between firms are large enough, the internal contract of the employers’ association implies 
that the bargaining problem between the employers’ association and the industry union is not a 
pie-splitting problem. We, therefore, carefully characterize the feasible set of the bargaining prob-
lem between an employers’ association and the industry union in order to establish that this bar-
gaining problem has a unique solution.
Our paper is closely related to work by Petrakis and Vlassis (1996), who investigate the 
endogenous formation of wage-bargaining institutions in a right-to-manage model. In their model, 
institutional arrangements are created by winning coalitions. They argue that if a majority of firms 
and unions are in favor of centralized bargaining, such an institution will evolve and be binding 
for all firms. In their model, efficient firms cooperate with unions to set higher wages in order to 
raise their rivals’ costs and thereby gain a strategic advantage on the product market. In countries 
such as Germany, however, the agreement between a union and an employers’ association is only 
binding for its members. Therefore, members of an employers’ association cannot rely on any 
legal institution to enforce higher wages for firms that do not join the employers’ association. 
Although unions recently have been lobbying to make centralized wage agreements binding for 
all firms in an industry, whether they are members of an employers’ association or not, this does 
not explain why employers’ associations currently exist.
Whether efficient firms may form an employers’ association to engage in a “raising rivals’ 
cost” strategy in the absence of generally binding wage agreements is questionable. In such a 
model, efficient firms would use an employers’ association to raise their wages in order to 
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increase the wages of their competitors. In a right-to-manage model, however, increasing the 
wages paid by member firms of the employers’ association decreases their labor demand. So, 
even if labor supply is upward sloping, higher wages within the employers’ association do not 
increase the wages paid by inefficient firms. To resurrect Petrakis and Vlassis’s argument, one 
needs to model why higher wages paid by efficient firms force inefficient firms to (substantially) 
raise their wages. In addition, such a model should explain the role of an employers’ association 
in such a raising rivals’ cost strategy. Instead of pursuing this, we use an efficient-bargaining 
model in which it is individually rational for each firm in the industry to join the employers’ asso-
ciation. In our model, firms form an employers’ association not to adopt a raising rivals’ cost 
strategy but simply to gain a bargaining advantage in the labor market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the product market 
and solves for the firms’ behavior given the bargaining outcome. Section 3 analyzes the decentral-
ized bargaining cases with firm- and industry-level unions. In Section 4 we introduce an employ-
ers’ association and solve the centralized bargaining case. To justify our approach, Section 5 
summarizes arguments in favor of using an efficient-bargaining model rather than a right-to-man-
age model. It also discusses implications of our model for testing the efficiency of labor market 
bargaining. Finally, Section 6 provides the conclusion. Most proofs are relegated to an appendix.
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2.  Product Market Competition
Throughout this paper, employers and unions bargain over wage and employment combina-
tions in different institutional settings. The various first-stage bargaining games considered are 
followed by a noncooperative second stage in which the firms compete against each other. This 
second stage has the same structure in all bargaining regimes that are considered within this paper. 
We thus start by solving the second stage, taking the first stage outcome as given.
Following Horn and Wolinsky (1988b), we model the second stage as a differentiated-quan-
tity-competition game. That is, we assume that firms simultaneously choose quantities facing the 
following inverse demand curves:
Furthermore, we assume that . Products are independent for . For  the 
products are perfect substitutes. In the intermediate cases where , the products are 
imperfect substitutes with a greater value of c indicating a higher degree of homogeneity of 
products.
Firms’ technology is assumed to be linear, such that  where  is the labor input of 
firm . The input-output ratio  denotes the amount of labor necessary to pro-
duce one unit of output. The lower the input-output ratio the more efficient a firm is. Let  
denote the employment level specified in the labor contract, i.e., the first-stage bargaining out-
come. If the union and the firm did not reach an agreement in the first stage, we define the break-
down point by , which states that production does not take place unless the firm and the 
union settle their labor dispute in the first stage. Let  be the wage rate specified in the labor 
contract. In case the first stage bargaining breaks down, we assume that all obligations of both the 
pi 1 qi– cqj.–=
0 c 1≤ ≤ c 0= c 1=
0 c 1< <
Li αiqi= Li
i 1 2,= αi 0 1 ],(∈
Li
Li 0=
wi
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firm and the union cease and simply set . Requiring subgame perfection, we look for a 
Nash equilibrium in the second stage taking  as given; that is, in the second stage 
of the game firm i solves the following maximization problem:
Thus, the best reply correspondence is
The above equation states that a firm sells the maximum quantity that its fixed labor force can 
produce, unless this quantity exceeds the revenue maximizing amount taking the other firm’s 
quantity as given. 
3.  Decentralized Bargaining
Based on the second stage introduced above, this section develops a simple two-stage model 
in which two firms are bargaining simultaneously with an industry-wide union before competing 
against each other on the output market. We start by analyzing two benchmark cases, one being 
firm-level bargaining and the other being an industry planner who maximizes the joint rent from 
cooperation between an industry union and both firms. We then relate these benchmark cases to 
the bargaining problems faced by an industry union. The main result of this section is that an 
industry union induces the monopoly product market outcome.
3.1.   Firm-level bargaining with firm-level unions
In this subsection, we consider two independent firm-level unions, each negotiating with a 
given firm. Let  denote the opportunity cost of labor.10 The utility of firm i’s union is 
wi 0=
L1 L2 w1 w2,, ,( )
max qi  1 qi– cqj–( )qi  s.t.  0 αiqi Li.≤ ≤
qi max 0 min
Li
αi
----
1 cqj–
2
---------------,
  
 
,
  
 
.=
w 0 1 ),[∈
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assumed to be  and each firm’s (owner’s) utility is assumed to be equal to the 
firm’s profits.11 For notational simplicity, let ; that is, firm  has a weakly higher produc-
tivity.
 Assume that a union and a firm, when bargaining with each other, take the solution of the 
rival firm’s bargaining problem as given.12 Throughout this paper we use the Nash solution (or 
extensions thereof) to model the bargaining outcome. One of the defining axioms of the Nash 
solution is that players agree on a Pareto-efficient outcome.13 Most alternative bargaining solu-
tions that have been proposed also require players to agree on Pareto efficient trades. Hence, we 
emphasize results that depend on Pareto efficiency only, such as
 Proposition 1.    The labor inputs chosen in firm-level bargaining with firm-level unions are 
identical to those chosen by a Cournot duopolist facing a given wage . That is, if 
, then  and . If 
, then , for .
Intuitively, Pareto efficiency implies that the owner of the firm and the union maximize the 
joint rent of cooperation. Hence, each firm’s labor input, which is determined in the first-stage 
bargaining, must be optimal given the other firm’s choice. With linear technology, the amount of 
labor input determines output. In other words, each firm’s output is chosen optimally given the 
10.This parameter restriction ensures that each firm would produce a positive amount if it were a monopolist 
on the output market.
11.Thus, in the terminology of Oswald (1985) we assume a utilitarian union with risk-neutral members.
12.Note that this assumption is implied by unobservable contracts. If contracts are observable, however, 
then there also exist solutions in which each union-firm pair makes their contract contingent on the other 
union-firm pairs’ contract in order to reduce product market competition. However, the conclusion that 
forming an industry union is profitable is not affected by either assumption. Furthermore, as we show 
below, with an industry-wide union the assumption that contracts are unobservable is not restrictive in 
our model.
Ui Li wi w–( )=
α1 α2≤ 1
w
c/2 1 α2w–( )/ 1 α1w–( )> L1 α1 1 α1w–( )/2= L2 0=
c/2 1 α2w–( )/ 1 α1w–( )≤ Li αi 2 1 αiw–( ) c 1 αjw–( )–[ ]/ 4 c2–( )= i j≠
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other firm’s output. Therefore, a firm’s output is equal to the Cournot output in a differentiated 
product game. Thus, the firm and the union jointly behave as would a neoclassical firm facing a 
competitive labor market with wage .
Hence, the joint rents from cooperation between the union and the firm are equal to the 
Cournot profits. Since we assume that both the union and the firm are risk-neutral, symmetry of 
the Nash solution implies that the firm and its union share benefits equally. Thus, both the union’s 
and the firm’s payoff are half of the Cournot profits. We summarize this result in
 Proposition 2.    With firm-level bargaining, the utility of each firm’s union is equal to half of 
the differentiated Cournot duopoly profit.
3.2.   Industry Planner’s Solution
We use the term industry planner to describe a single decision maker who controls both firms 
and who can hire labor at its opportunity cost. An industry planner is a natural benchmark, 
because he earns the maximum rents that the bargaining parties can divide between themselves. 
Consider such an industry planner and assume he faces the inverse demand functions specified in 
Section 2. Thus, the industry planner solves the following maximization problem:
 It is easy to show that the objective function is concave. Thus, solving the above Kuhn-Tucker 
13.Pareto efficiency or efficient bargaining refers to agreements between players who negotiate with each 
other. Thus, firm-level bargaining is called efficient if the union and the firm are negotiating over the 
wage and employment level. Because each firm-level bargaining does not internalize the effect of an 
increased production on the other firm-union pair, the outcome is not efficient from the overall industry 
perspective. Nevertheless, the term efficient bargaining is conventionally used in the manner described 
above, which is justified if contracts are unobservable.
w
maxL1 L2,   1
L1
α1
-----– c
L2
α2
-----–  
L1
α1
----- 1
L2
α2
-----– c
L1
α1
-----–  
L2
α2
----- w– L1 L+ 2( )   s.t.  L1 0 L2 0.≥,≥+
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problem, one has 
 Proposition 3.    The labor inputs chosen by an industry planner are identical to the ones 
chosen by an industry-wide monopolist facing a given wage . That is, if 
, then  and . If 
, then , for .
The intuition behind the above is simple. If the goods produced are close substitutes, then the 
industry planner uses only the more efficient firm to produce. As the goods become less substitut-
able, the planner will produce both goods and thus operate both firms. When compared to firm-
level bargaining, an industry planner is quicker to close down the less efficient firm, which fol-
lows from comparing Proposition 3 to Proposition 1. Intuitively, an industry planner internalizes 
the effect of an increase in one firm’s output on the other firm’s demand. Because in our model 
firms produce substitutes, it is less profitable for an industry planner to operate a less efficient 
firm. For the same reason, an industry planner chooses lower output levels in our model whenever 
it is optimal for him to produce both goods.
For future reference, let  be the industry planner’s reduced form profits. Sub-
stituting the optimal labor inputs as specified in Proposition 3, one has
 Proposition 4.   If , an industry planner’s reduced form profits are 
. If , an industry planner’s reduced 
form profits are 
w
c 1 α2w–( )/ 1 α1w–( )> L1∗ α1 1 α1w–( )/2= L2∗ 0=
c 1 α2w–( )/ 1 α1w–( )≤ Li∗ αi 1 αiw–( ) c 1 αjw–( )–[ ]/ 2 1 c
2–( )[ ]= i j≠
Π α1 α2 w c,, ,( )
c 1 α2w–( )/ 1 α1w–( )>
Π α1 α2 w c, , ,( ) 1 α1w–( )
2/4= c 1 α2w–( )/ 1 α1w–( )≤
Π α1 α2 w c,, ,( ) 1 α1w–( )
2 1 α2w–( )
2 2c 1 α1w–( ) 1 α2w–( )–+[ ]/ 4 1 c
2–( )[ ].=
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3.3.   Firm-level bargaining with an industry-wide union
We are now prepared to analyze the case of an industry-wide union that is bargaining simul-
taneously with both firms. Let the industry-wide union’s utility be defined as the sum of the utility 
of its members, i.e., let . As in the firm-level case, the industry 
union can be interpreted as a utilitarian union with risk-neutral members. In this interpretation, the 
union cares about all (potential) workers in the industry. For each individual worker, there are 
three possible states: He is employed at , he is employed at , or he is not employed at all 
and receives . If all workers are risk neutral, the union’s objective is equivalent to maximizing 
.
The industry union bargains with the firms about how to distribute the rents from coopera-
tion, i.e., about the profit level each firm receives and the industry union’s utility level. Once an 
agreement is reached, we assume that it is implemented as a contract specifying . That is, 
we assume that the union and the firms can costlessly specify wage rates and employment levels 
in their first stage bargaining agreements. We show in the Appendix that
 Lemma 1.   If , any bargaining solution to the pair of bargaining 
problems between a centralized union and each firm that is Pareto-efficient induces the product 
market output that an industry planner would choose.
Economists widely believe that negotiating players should agree on Pareto-efficient out-
comes. If, however, the industry union and the firms agree to a jointly Pareto-efficient outcome, 
then an industry union leads to the monopoly output on the product market, thereby, having an 
adverse effect on consumer surplus and overall welfare.
U w1 w–( )L1 w2 w–( )L2+=
w1 w2
w
w1 w–( )L1 w2 w–( )L2+
wi Li,( )
c 1 α2w–( )/ 1 α1w–( )≤
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Recently, Boughin and Vannini (1996) emphasized the necessity of critically evaluating 
industry-wide bargaining from an antitrust perspective. Our analysis adds to this reasoning by 
pointing out that it is not centralized bargaining per se that is required to enforce cartel-like agree-
ments on the output market. It is sufficient if one player is horizontally integrated to enforce the 
industry-wide monopoly output. Therefore, our model predicts that abolishing centralized bar-
gaining without disbanding industry unions will not avoid cartel-like product market outcomes.
One should be careful when drawing antitrust conclusions based on the analysis so far. We 
have not yet ruled out that Pareto-efficient bargaining outcomes require a firm to engage in side 
payments to its rival.14 Such side payments, if necessary, would fall under antitrust scrutiny, and 
existing laws in many countries already forbid such bargaining agreements. However, in the bar-
gaining solution we propose below no such side payments are necessary. The bargaining solution 
we use, which is Pareto-efficient, can be implemented through a pair of bilateral contracts 
(between the union and each firm) that only cover the wage rate and the minimum amount of 
labor. To derive this result, we use
 Lemma 2.   If , any bargaining solution to the pair of bargaining 
problems between a centralized union and each firm that is Pareto-efficient and in which firm 2 
receives zero profits induces the product market output that an industry planner would choose.
Since the proof is similar to that of Lemma 1, it is omitted. In the above lemma, firm 2’s prof-
its are set to zero because we require each firm to realize its profits on the output market. If 
, no agreement in which firm 2 is required to earn positive profits, i.e., 
produce positive amounts, can induce the industry planner’s product market outcome, because in 
14.Boughin and Vannini (1996) consider the case of perfectly symmetric firms only. Hence, they do not have 
to investigate the issue of side payments between firms. 
c 1 α2w–( )/ 1 α1w–( )>
c 1 α2w–( )/ 1 α1w–( )>
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this case an industry planner would choose to shut firm 2 down. In the bargaining solution used 
below, however, firm 2 receives zero profits if the industry planner would choose to shut it down.
Next, we propose a solution to the union’s two-front bargaining problem, which is an exten-
sion of the Nash bargaining solution. We argue that the agreement between the industry-wide 
union and firm i must be the Nash solution to their bargaining problem, taken as given that the 
other bargaining problem is resolved.15
 Definition 1.   The bargaining solution between the industry union and either firm is the 
Nash bargaining solution, taking as given that the bargaining between the union and the other firm 
resulted in an agreement about the other firms’ profit level.
As a strategic motivation of the above definition, consider the following Rubinstein-type 
alternating-offer model: In the first period the union offers each firm a profit level . 
If both firms accept, the game ends with the firms receiving . If only one firm 
accepts, it is paid the offer it received. The remaining firm and the union bargain precisely as in 
Rubinstein (1982), with the firm making the opening offer. If both firms reject the offer, they 
simultaneously make counter-offers to the union in the next period, and the bargaining proceeds 
in the same way as above. Players have a common discount rate . It follows from Lemma 1 in 
Jun (1989) that this alternating-offer model has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. In 
the limit, as the time between periods goes to zero, this outcome converges to the bargaining solu-
tion proposed above and solved for below.
15.This is the usual assumption if the bargaining parties can write binding agreements. Within a right-to-
manage model, this approach has been used by, for example, Horn and Wolinsky (1988b). It is also used 
in Chipty and Snyder’s (1999) bargaining study of the cable industry.
πi wi L1 L2, ,( )
πi wi L1 L2, ,( )
δ
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Let  denote the maximum joint rent of the union and firm j, given that firm i produces 
nothing. Thus, .
 Definition 2.   Firm i’s veto-power  is the amount of the industry rents that depend on 
firm i’s participation in production. It will be denoted .
Clearly a firm’s veto-power depends on both the product market substitutability and the tech-
nological differences between firms. For example, if the firms produce independent goods, 
, then firm i’s veto-power is equal to . In contrast, if the goods are perfect substitutes, 
, and the firms’ technologies are identical, , then each firm’s veto power is equal 
to zero. More generally, substituting the appropriate values of  from Proposition 4 into Defini-
tion 2 yields
 Proposition 5.    If , then firm 1’s veto power is 
 and firm 2’s veto power is . If 
, then firm i’s veto power is 
 for .
Given that the union and firm j resolved their bargaining problem, firm i and the union nego-
tiate over the incremental benefit generated if the union also reaches an agreement with firm i. 
Thus, the union and firm i are bargaining about . Given the risk-neutral utility functions speci-
fied above, the symmetry axiom of the Nash solution ensures that the players share  equally. 
We summarize this discussion in
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 Proposition 6.    The bargaining solution between the industry union and both firms, for any 
vector , is a vector of payoffs in which firm i’s profits are  and the union’s utility 
is equal to .
In the above bargaining solution the players’ shares add up to , which implies that the labor 
inputs are chosen to maximize industry rents. To illustrate why the bargaining pairs do not choose 
the labor inputs that produce the Cournot quantity, consider the following simple strategic model: 
In the first period firms simultaneously make a take it or leave it offer. This offer is a demand for 
a certain profit level, which intuitively can be thought of as a rental fee. In the next period the 
union chooses whether to accept or reject each individual offer. There is a unique subgame perfect 
equilibrium outcome in which each firm receives  and the union utility is .16 In 
this model, the union when accepting an offer becomes the residual claimant of any profits (or 
losses) greater (or less) than the rental fee. Because the union is the residual claimant in both 
firms, it wants to maximize industry rents. We emphasize that an industry union leads to the 
monopoly production if each bargaining problem is resolved efficiently, independent of the 
union’s bargaining power.
16.In this footnote, we sketch the proof that no other subgame perfect pure strategy equilibrium outcome 
exists. (The proof that no other mixed strategy equilibrium outcome exists is similar.) By subgame per-
fection the union accepts every offer below . Thus, no offer below  can be part of a subgame perfect 
equilibrium, since firm i would want to raise its offer slightly. Whenever the sum of the firms’ demands is 
greater than  the union is better off rejecting (at least) one of the offers. Consider the subcase in 
which the accepted offer is greater than . Then firm j can make a deviating offer slightly greater than 
 that is accepted by subgame perfection and yields positive profits. Thus, this subcase can not be an 
equilibrium outcome. Consider the remaining subcase in which the accepted offer is identical to . 
Hence, the offer of firm j is greater than . In this case, if  firm i can make an offer slightly greater 
than  that the union accepts. Thus, for  this subcase can not be an equilibrium outcome. If  
in this subcase, firm j could earn positive profits when offering (slightly below) . Thus no pure strategy 
subgame perfect equilibrium exists in which a firm demands more than .
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The assumption that bargaining is efficient is, however, stronger in the oligopoly case than in 
the monopoly case. It is not sufficient only to bargain over wages and employment within a given 
firm. Instead, wage and employment levels in one firm have to be made contingent on whether the 
other bargaining problem is resolved.17 It is easy to find examples in which both firms in the 
industry gain when the scope of bargaining is restricted to non-contingent wage and employment 
levels in each firm.18 It is unclear, however, what is meant by (credibly) committing not to bar-
gain over a certain variable.19 In an alternating-offer model, for example, the union could always 
make its offer contingent on whether the other bargaining problem is resolved. Also, even in the 
ultimatum offer game considered above, a firm cannot make itself better off by unilaterally com-
mitting only to bargain over wages and employment. 
Once reached, the bargaining solution can be implemented by a pair of contracts between the 
union and each firm over the firm’s wage rate and employment level. 
 Proposition 7.   If , then the solution to the bargaining problem 
between the industry union and both firms can be implemented by a pair of contracts specifying
 and .
If , then the solution to the bargaining problem between the industry 
union and both firms can be implemented by a pair of contracts specifying
17.In contrast to the firm-level bargaining case, however, the contracts between the union and the firms do 
not have to be observable to implement the overall monopoly outcome. Instead, it is sufficient to let the 
union choose  and to make each firm’s wage payment contingent on its observed profit levels.
18.Consider for example identical firms producing homogenous products, in which case . 
19.Obviously, the firms would prefer not to bargain over wages at all. Now, suppose that the firm has to bar-
gain over wages. Then Dorwick (1990) shows under fairly general conditions that, when facing firm-
level unions, firms prefer only to bargain over wages rather than wages and employment.
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  for .
PROOF: Substituting the appropriate values for any tuple  from Proposition 4 and 
Proposition 5 into Proposition 6, recalling that Pareto efficiency implies that the labor inputs are 
identical to the labor inputs specified in Proposition 3, yields the desired result. Q.E.D.
It is easy to check that at the contracts introduced above, firms have an incentive to hire less 
labor than written into the contract. Hence, the contracts need to specify the wage rate and mini-
mum employment level only. Also, note that for  the industry-wide union’s payoff specified 
in Proposition 6 is greater than half of the maximum overall rent from cooperation . Since by 
definition  is greater than or equal to the industry rents in the case of product differentiated 
Cournot competition, an industry union makes the group of workers as a whole better off. Thus, it 
is always profitable for workers to form an industry union if firms produce substitutes.
We view the bargaining problems between the industry-wide union and the firms as simulta-
neous bargaining problems. Alternatively, one might model the bargaining as sequential. Assume 
for the moment that the union bargains first with firm 1 and then with firm 2.20 When facing firm 
2, there are two classes of subgames to consider: First, subgames in which the union reached an 
agreement with firm 1 about firm 1’s profit level. In these subgames, the union and firm 2 bargain 
over the incremental benefit of reaching an agreement with firm 2, i.e., over  as specified in 
Proposition 5. If the union did not reach an agreement with firm 1, then it bargains with firm 2 
about how to divide . Symmetry implies in either case that both players receive half of the pie 
over which they bargain.
20.Dobson (1994) interprets this as pattern bargaining. Using a right-to-manage model, Dobson also finds 
that pattern bargaining generally results in asymmetric wages rather than standardized wages. 
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1 αiw–( ) c 1 αjw–( )+
4αi
------------------------------------------------------- w+= Li∗
αi 1 αiw–( ) c 1 αjw–( )–[ ]
2 1 c2–( )
-----------------------------------------------------------------=,  
 
i j≠
Π V1 V2, ,( )
c 0>
Π
Π
V2
Π2
m
Page 18
Now consider the bargaining problem between firm i and the union. By subgame perfection, 
players foresee that if their negotiations break down the union’s payoff is . They also fore-
see that if they reach an agreement about firm 1’s profit level, the union will pay  to firm 2. 
Thus, in case firm 1 and the union reach an agreement, they are left to split  of the indus-
try profits. Since the union’s breakdown point in the first stage bargaining is , the net pie of 
the first bargaining is . By symmetry of the Nash solution, the union and the 
firm share this net pie equally.21 If the goods are substitutes, , then  and thus firm 1 
receives a higher profit level in the sequential bargaining case. The union thus receives a lower 
share. Nevertheless, the union is still the residual claimant to the industry profits, ensuring that 
industry rents are maximized.
In this section, we showed that it is always beneficial for workers to form an industry union if 
firms produce substitutes. We also showed that, even though bargaining is decentralized, the for-
mation of an industry union leads to the same product market output that an industry monopolist 
would choose. Thus, the main antitrust issue is not whether bargaining is decentralized but 
whether the parties involved are organized on a decentralized basis. If this is not the case, the 
industry union can be used by the bargaining parties to eliminate effective product market compe-
tition.
To avoid effective product market competition, the bargaining parties have to agree on a 
wage rate and a minimum employment level. Because the wage rate is used to distribute rents 
21.To implement the Nash solution noncooperatively, consider the following two period model: In time 
period one, the union bargains with firm 1 in an infinite alternating-offer model similar to the one intro-
duced in Binmore et al. (1986). Their setup replaces the time cost of rejecting an offer by the exogenous 
risk that the bargaining ends. In time period two the union bargains with firm 2 in the same fashion. Pro-
duction takes place at the end of period two. Binmore et al. show that as the breakdown probability 
approaches zero the unique subgame perfect outcome of such an alternating-offer model approaches the 
Nash solution. Thus, in the limit as the breakdown probability approaches zero in both bargaining prob-
lems, subgame perfection implies that players share the industry rents as specified in the main text. 
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from overall cooperation to the individual workers, it is a distorted signal of the firms’ labor cost. 
Individual firms would prefer to hire less labor at the ongoing wage, but are restricted by the min-
imum employment level specified. 
4.  Centralized Bargaining and Employers’ Associations
In this section we introduce the concept of an employers’ association. We start out by solving 
for the centralized bargaining outcome when the members of an employers’ association can 
engage in side payments, which, alternatively, can be interpreted as a merger between firms. In 
contrast to Horn and Wolinsky (1988b), such a merger is profitable in our framework. We then 
characterize the solution to the centralized bargaining case if firms are not allowed to engage in 
side payments. The main result of this section is that it is always profitable for competing firms to 
form an employers’ association independent of their productivity differences.
4.1.   Employers’ Associations
We model an employers’ association as a coalition of firms that decide to bargain jointly with 
the industry union. In contrast to a merger, members of an employers’ association are restricted 
only to cooperate on the input market. That is, they are allowed to bargain jointly about price and 
quantity combinations on the input market, but they are (legally) restricted from cooperating 
explicitly otherwise. This rules out any form of side payments between firms. For example, a firm 
can not pay its rival to produce less. Firms can not agree on a profit-sharing scheme. A member of 
an employers’ association is not allowed to pay a fellow member to accept an otherwise unfavor-
able union offer. An employers’ association can only be used by firms to bargain jointly in the 
labor market. Hence, in our model firms behave noncooperatively on the output market.
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For an employers’ association to influence the labor market bargaining, its members need to 
commit to negotiate jointly. We model this commitment as an implicit contract. This contract 
specifies how the share of the employers’ association is divided between its members. Thus, the 
employers’ association is committed to accept only those offers from the union that induce the 
agreed-upon relative profitability of firm 1 to firm 2. Firms have an incentive to use the labor mar-
ket bargaining to induce an implicit side-payment scheme through insisting on the appropriate 
wage differentials. However, they are restricted by the fact that the union can not force a worker 
to work below the opportunity cost of labor.
 Definition 3.   An employers’ association is a coalition of firms that maximizes the sum of its 
members’ profits subject to an agreed upon division scheme , where  denotes 
the proportion of the share of the employers’ association, , that firm i receives and 
.
4.2.   Centralized bargaining with side payments
As a benchmark, we investigate the case where the members of an employers’ association 
can engage in side payments, which alternatively can be interpreted as a merger between firms. If 
side payments are feasible, Pareto efficiency implies that the union and the employers’ associa-
tion will agree on the optimal labor inputs specified in Proposition 3. That is, the employers’ asso-
ciation and the union in this case will maximize the overall industry rents and bargain over a 
division thereof. We assume that the bargaining solution for the bargaining problem between the 
employers’ association and the union is the Nash bargaining solution. Since both the union and 
s1 s2,( ) si 0 1,( )∈
ΠEA
s1 s2+ 1=
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the employers’ association are assumed to be risk neutral, Pareto efficiency and symmetry of the 
Nash solution imply
 Proposition 8.    If side payments are feasible, the Nash solution to the bargaining problem 
between the employers’ association and the industry union is the vector .
To further justify our approach, we provide a strategic motivation for the bargaining solution 
between the union and the employers’ association. Given the division specified in the “founding 
contract” of the employers’ association, let either firm represent the employers’ association in a 
Rubinstein-type alternating-offer model with a common discount factor. Chae and Heidhues 
(1999) show that if the coalition members are identical and share the benefits identically, then the 
unique subgame perfect equilibrium is independent of which coalition member represents the 
coalition. For the linear utility functions we use, it is straightforward to generalize this irrelevance 
result to any fixed sharing rule. In the limit as , the unique subgame perfect outcome con-
verges to the Nash solution specified above.
Since the Nash solution is the solution concept used throughout this paper, it is natural to 
model the employers’ association as a coalition of players whose division scheme splits the gains 
from forming an employers’ association between the firms according to the Nash solution. 
Assuming that after the firms fail to form an employers’ association they can bargain with the 
union individually, one has
 Lemma 3.   Whenever side payments are feasible, the division scheme of the employers’ 
association is defined by .
Π/2 Π/2,( )
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PROOF: A firm’s breakdown payoff, when bargaining over whether or not to form an employers’ 
association, is its profits if no employers’ association forms. Thus, firm i’s breakdown point is 
. The joint benefit of forming an employers’ association is . Because both 
firms are risk neutral, symmetry of the Nash solution implies that each firm receives the sum of its 
breakdown payoff and half of the benefit from forming an employers’ association. Thus,  is 
chosen such that
 . 
Rewriting yields the desired result. Q.E.D.
Combining Proposition 8 and Lemma 3 one has
 Proposition 9.   If side payments are feasible, the bargaining solution between the industry 
union and members of an employers’ association is a vector of payoffs in which firm i’s profits are 
, for , and the industry union’s utility is equal to .
4.3.   Centralized bargaining without side payments
The feasible set without side payments is contained in the feasible set with side payments. 
Thus, by independence of irrelevant alternatives, the Nash solutions to both bargaining problems 
are identical if the Nash solution to the games with side payments can be implemented without 
using side payments. We thus start by investigating whether the Nash solution to the game with 
side payments can be implemented by a contract that only specifies the wage rate and employ-
ment level for each firm.
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In the absence of side payments, a firm’s payoff is equal to its revenue on the output market 
minus its cost. For notational simplicity, let 
.
Assuming that the union can not force any worker to work for a wage rate below , one has
 Lemma 4.   If  then the maximum payoff of firm i that can be imple-
mented without side payments at the industry wide optimal employment levels is 
 for .
PROOF: A firm’s revenue is determined by the employment levels only. Thus, given the optimal 
employment levels specified in Proposition 3, the maximum payoff a firm can receive without 
side payments is determined by its cost. Since  is the lowest feasible wage rate it must minimize 
costs for a given employment level. Substituting  into  gives the 
desired result. Q.E.D.
Next, we analyze the bargaining problem between the union and the employers’ association 
for any given . We start by proving that the side-payment solution is feasible without side pay-
ments if and only if the inefficient firm can earn its payoff on the product market.
 Proposition 10.   Let  be given. The Nash solution to the bargaining problem between the 
union and the employers’ association is identical to the side-payment solution  if and 
only if .
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We are left to characterize the Nash solution to the bargaining problem between an employ-
ers’ association and an industry union for the cases where . We 
start by showing that this bargaining problem is convex, which implies that it has a unique Nash 
solution.
 Definition 4.   Let  be given. The Pareto frontier is a function mapping each feasible pay-
off of the employers’ association, , into the maximum feasible union’s payoff. It will be 
denoted as .
When side payments were feasible,  was simply . Without side pay-
ments this is not generally true. By definition, however,
, (1)
for the Pareto-efficient labor inputs .22 In the following, we will adopt the convention of 
calling the sum of the firms’ profits and the union’s utility the overall industry rents. 
The following two lemmas enable us to show the convexity of the bargaining problem 
between the union and the employers’ association.
 Lemma 5.   Let  be given and let . For any  for which 
 one has .
Intuitively, if the bargaining parties are not able to extract the overall industry rents that a 
monopoly would, it is because the less efficient firm needs to earn its share on the product market. 
22.Note that without side payments a Pareto-efficient labor input vector  does not have to equal 
.
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Thus, to minimize the overall production distortions from an industry perspective, the bargaining 
outcome sets the wage rate in the inefficient firm equal to the reservation wage.
 Let , denote the maximum share the employers’ association can receive such that, 
, for all . One has
 Lemma 6.   Let  be given and let . If  
one has .
The above lemma implies that the Pareto frontier is downwards sloping. Based on this result, 
we derive the following proposition in the Appendix:
 Proposition 11.   Let  be given and let . The feasible set of 
bargaining problem between the union and the employers’ association is convex.
Thus, we have proven that for any employers’ association contract , there exists a unique 
Nash solution to the bargaining problem between the employers’ association and the industry 
union. Next, we establish the profitability of forming an employers’ association. Note that we do 
not require any restriction on the productivity difference between the firms to establish this result.
 Theorem 1.   If , there always exists an agreement in which both firms gain by forming 
an employers’ association.
PROOF: First, we show that
 . (2)
This follows trivially if . Thus, consider the remaining cases in which 
. Proposition 5 and Lemma 4 imply that (2) can be rewritten as
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which is equivalent to .
Also, since , one has . Thus, there exist some  for which
,
,
, and
 . 
Hence for any , there exist an agreement in which both firms strictly gain by forming an 
employers’ association. Q.E.D.
 It is easy to check that an employers’ association, in contrast to a merger, may reduce welfare 
in the presence of an industry union. For example, a member of an employers’ association might 
continue producing a homogenous product even if he has lower productivity than a competing 
member of the employers’ association. The increase in his production, however, would be offset 
by the decrease in the more efficient firm’s production and thus the product market distortion 
would be unchanged. In this case an employers’ association simply raises the cost of production. 
If the low productivity firm is not a member of an employers’ association, then an industry-wide 
union would not be willing to settle this labor dispute and thereby shut such a low-productivity 
firm down.
5.  The Scope of Labor Market Negotiations
In this section, we discuss the theoretical and empirical literature on the scope of labor mar-
ket negotiations. We start off discussing the bilateral monopoly case, which is the focus of most of 
the collective bargaining literature. After presenting some support in favor of the efficient-bar-
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gaining model in the bilateral monopoly case, we argue that in the case of strong industry-unions 
both labor and product market evidence is required to investigate the scope of labor market nego-
tiations. 
Suppose a monopolist needs to reach an agreement with a single union in order to produce. 
The main stream approach to this bilateral bargaining problem is to assume that the firm bargains 
with the union over wages only. Once a wage settlement is reached, the firm hires workers and 
produces output. This model thus captures the notion that we typically only observe wage negoti-
ations.23 Some evidence in favor of this presumption can be found in Oswald (1993) who, in a 
survey of American and British unions, asks whether they normally negotiate over jobs as well as 
wages. Not only are total employment levels usually unspecified in the labor contracts, but almost 
all of the unions surveyed answered that they do not negotiate over the number of jobs at all. 
Nevertheless, based on earlier work of Leontief (1946), McDonald and Solow (1981) criti-
cize the above right-to-manage approach since in these models the firm and the union can reach 
Pareto-efficient outcomes only if they negotiate over wages and employment.24 Why then do the 
bargaining parties settle for a Pareto-dominated outcome?
This theoretical problem is especially troublesome since in the right-to-manage model the 
bargaining problem is resolved using the “Nash solution,” subject to the (binding) constraint that 
the employment level is on the firm’s labor demand curve. The Nash solution, however, is a bar-
gaining solution satisfying a set of axioms, one of which is Pareto efficiency. Followers of the 
23.See, for example, Layard et al. (1991), who argue forcefully that labor negotiations only cover wages.
24.Oswald (1985, 1993), however, proposes a union model in which the median voter determines the 
union’s preferences. Assuming that layoffs - but not wages - depend on seniority, he shows that “effi-
cient” contracts lie on the labor demand curve in his model. If in Oswald’s model wages are also allowed 
to depend on seniority (or tenure), however, then the median voter has an incentive to let the firm hire 
additional (low tenure) labor at lower wages; for this will increase the rents that the firm earns and hence 
it will also increase the median voter’s share of these rents.
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right-to-manage approach thus explicitly or implicitly assume that it is infeasible to write con-
tracts specifying both employment levels and wage rates. Since we are not aware of any legal 
restrictions, one should model why efficient contracts are infeasible. 
Inspired by the theoretical debate and the pioneering papers of Brown and Ashenfelter (1986) 
and MaCurdy and Pencavel (1986), there have been numerous empirical studies aimed at testing 
whether actual employment levels in unionized industries are consistent with the right-to-man-
age-model or the efficient-bargaining model. Most of these studies conclude that their empirical 
evidence favors the efficient-bargaining model.25 This raises the puzzle as to why negotiations 
that seemingly cover wages only, lead to efficient outcomes.
One response in favor of the efficient-bargaining model is that we observe many features in 
labor contracts that indirectly determine employment levels. Such contractual features include 
unnecessary security rules that lead to overstaffing, overtime restrictions, overtime pay, firing 
rules, and so on. This response, however, raises the question as to why this implicit agreement 
dominates explicit ones. Also, as Oswald (1993) points out, some of these rules may be better 
interpreted as regulating effort than employment levels.26 
Manning (1987), however, shows in a sequential employment-wage bargaining model that 
the efficient-bargaining outcome emerges if employment is set unilaterally by the firm before the 
parties bargain over wages. Thus, if the employment level is rigid after wage negotiations have 
25.See, for instance, Brown and Ashenfelter (1986), MaCurdy and Pencavel (1986), Svenjar (1986), Card 
(1986), Abowd (1989), Martinello (1988), Dorion (1987), Bean and Turnbull (1988), Christofides and 
Oswald (1991), and Dorion (1992). A counterexample, however, is Card (1990).
26.Another response in favor of the efficient-bargaining model is that, even if the employment level is not 
explicitly determined by the labor contract, the bargaining outcome may be an implicit agreement on the 
amount of labor usage. Espinosa and Rhee (1989) and Eberwein and Kollintaz (1995) model supergames 
in which the union and the firm write contracts over wages only. They show that, for sufficiently low dis-
count rates, trigger strategies can support the efficient-bargaining solution. Nevertheless, this does not 
explain why Oswald (1993) finds that unions and firms typically do not negotiate over employment lev-
els.
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ended, an efficient-bargaining model should be used to predict the outcome - even if unions and 
firms do not negotiate over employment. Furthermore, since at the solution of the efficient-bar-
gaining model firms prefer to hire less labor, this result relies only on employment being down-
ward rigid after wage-negotiations have ended. Thus, in countries with restrictive dismissal laws, 
such as Germany, wage negotiations may lead to the efficient outcome.27 
The point here is not so much that dismissal laws - or some other specific contractual feature 
- will always lead to efficient bargaining outcomes, but rather that one needs to be careful when 
imposing observed (equilibrium) behavior as the rule of the game. The fact that we often see wage 
contracts does not imply that a right-to-manage model is a good predictor of labor market out-
comes. While the scope of labor market negotiations is ultimately an empirical question, we 
believe that an efficient-bargaining model is a natural benchmark in situations in which a few par-
ties are involved.28 For if the outcome differs significantly form the efficient one, the parties have 
a strong incentive to reach a better agreement.
In the bilateral monopoly problem, bargaining over wages and employment always allows for 
an efficient solution. In the case of an industry-wide union facing an oligopoly this is not the case. 
If, for example, the industry union bargains with each firm over wages and employment, taking as 
given the wage and employment bargaining outcomes with the other firms, then the result will be 
excessive product market competition from an industry perspective. Hence, in such industries a 
27.In Germany, for example, a firm wanting to dismiss a significant portion of its work force needs to nego-
tiate a social dismissal plan with the work council. In case negotiations break down, there is a system of 
compulsory arbitration. Roughly speaking, a firm is usually required to pay each worker it dismisses an 
entire year’s wage, unless the firm’s financial situation prohibits such a solution. For a detailed discussion 
of the laws governing dismissals in Germany see Soltwedel et al. (1990).
28.Nevertheless, it may be interesting to investigate whether, in the absence of restrictive dismissal laws, 
collective bargaining agreements include contractual features that ensure downward rigidity of employ-
ment. 
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model in which players only bargaining over wages and employment should not be confused with 
an efficient bargaining model. 
With industry-wide unionization, plugging the opportunity cost of labor into a firm’s labor 
demand curve will not give the efficient employment level as is generally assumed in empirical 
studies.29 Rather, it will lead to overemployment since additional employment has a negative 
externality on the other unionized firms in the industry. Indeed, while in the bilateral monopoly 
case the right-to-manage model leads to underemployment due to the double marginalization 
problem, this is not necessarily the case when an industry-wide union bargains with oligopolistic 
firms. In such a setup additional employment in a given firm has a negative externality on its 
rivals profits. If this product market externality dominates the double marginalization effect, then 
the efficient employment level is less than the right-to-manage employment level. Hence, in an 
oligopolistic industry in which labor is not organized on a firm-level basis, current empirical 
approaches are unable to test whether bargaining is efficient or not. Future empirical work will 
need to account for product market interdependencies between firms whose workers are orga-
nized by the same union.
29.An alternative test suggest by Abowd (1989) investigates whether unexpected changes in bargained upon 
labor costs lead to changes of equal size and opposite sign in shareholder wealth. If this is the case, 
Abowd maintains the null hypotheses that bargaining is efficient. For given efficient employment levels 
in our model, unexpected changes in the bargained upon labor cost would indeed lead to changes in 
shareholder wealth of equal size and opposite sign. There are two important caveats however: First, this 
is true for any other given employment level also. Hence, one may simply test whether employment is 
rigid in the short run. Second, and more seriously, in our model (as in the standard bilateral monopoly 
model) the predicted contract wage is an endogenous variable that changes only if either the opportunity 
cost of labor, the firms productivity, or the market demand changes. Such changes, however, will lead to 
changes in the efficient employment levels and, in this case, Abowd’s testing approach is invalid. 
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6.  Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that it is always profitable for workers to form an industry union if 
firms produce substitutes. We also showed that - even if bargaining is decentralized - the forma-
tion of an industry union leads to the same product market output an industry monopolist would 
choose. Thus, the main antitrust issue is not whether bargaining is decentralized but whether the 
parties involved are organized on a decentralized basis. If this is not the case, the industry union 
can be used by the bargaining parties to eliminate effective product market competition. Although 
the overall industry output is the same as the industry output a monopolist would choose, individ-
ual firms would prefer to reduce production levels even more in the proposed bargaining solution.
We then investigated the role of employers’ associations. We showed that in an efficient-bar-
gaining model, forming an employers’ association increases the firms’ bargaining power. Even if 
there are substantial productivity differences, competing firms have an incentive to respond to an 
industry-wide union by forming an employers’ association. This countervailing power move, 
however, can lead to inefficiencies in production that otherwise would not exist.
If firms’ productivity differences are small, employers’ associations have distributional but 
not efficiency consequences. Thus our model predicts that a policy of abolishing centralized bar-
gaining will not per se lead to higher output levels in industries that are characterized by efficient 
bargaining. Furthermore, to ensure a substantial increase in employment, according to our model, 
one would have to abolish both industry-wide bargaining and industry-wide unions.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: A Pareto-efficient outcome maximizes the union’s utility for a given 
profit level of the firm. Thus for a given , it solves the following maximization problem:
,
for some nonnegative . Setting up the Lagrangian and differentiating yields the first-order con-
ditions
,
,
,
where  denotes the Lagrange multiplier. Substituting  from the first equation into the sec-
ond yields
,
which is the familiar reaction function from the differentiated product Cournot duopoly, if there is 
an interior solution in which both firms produce. Symmetry with respect to the other bargaining 
problem implies that an interior solution satisfies
, (3)
. (4)
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It is straightforward to show that an interior solution exists if and only if 
. Solving equations (3) and (4) yields the labor inputs specified in 
Proposition 1. If no interior solution exists, the labor input of the inefficient firm . Substi-
tuting this into equation (3) completes the proof of Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1: A Pareto-efficient outcome maximizes the union’s utility, while holding the 
firms’ profits constant at some pre-specified level. Thus, it solves the maximization problem
.
If the maximization problem has an interior solution, it can be found using the Lagrangian
where  denote the Lagrangian multipliers. An interior solution satisfies the following first 
order conditions:
,
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.
The last two first order conditions specify the profits each firm receives. Since, , 
the first four equations can be summarized by the following two conditions:
, (5)
. (6)
It is straightforward to verify that for  one has an interior solution.
Since conditions (5) and (6) are identical to the first order conditions of an industry planner they 
yield the same solution. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 10: Since the Nash solution satisfies independence of irrelevant alterna-
tives, it suffices to show that the side-payment solution is feasible without side payments if and 
only if . The only if statement is trivial. To prove the if statement, 
let  be the wage rate such that . Because firm 1 is weakly 
more efficient . Thus, there exist a  such that 
. Since , one also has 
. Q.E.D.
 Lemma A.1: Let  be given and let . For any  for which 
 one has .
PROOF: One has
, (7)
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. (8)
Equation (7) follows from the statement of the lemma and (8) follows from the fact that firm 1 is 
weakly more efficient. Because , the optimal labor inputs  are 
infeasible and, thus, at least one of the two following equations is satisfied:
, (9)
. (10)
Note that if both of the above equations are satisfied then  is not feasible. Suppose (9) is not 
satisfied. Hence, (10) must be. In this case, one can summarize equations (7) to (10) by the fol-
lowing two equations:
,
,
which is absurd. Thus, (9) must be satisfied. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5: Suppose not. Then the Pareto-efficient utilities are induced by a tuple 
, for which  and . Because in the no-side-payment 
solution ,  implies that . 
Since the side-payment solution is infeasible, Lemma A.1 implies that 
. By continuity of  in labor inputs, there exists a vector 
, on the straight line connecting  and , for which 
. By concavity of the overall industry rents, overall industry rents 
are greater at  than at . By equation (1), overall industry rents can be written as 
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rents implies that . Thus,  is a feasible choice which yields 
higher industry rents, contradicting the claim that  was Pareto optimal. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6: By equation (1), one has
,
where  denotes the optimal labor inputs given  and . Since , 
 and . Hence, by continuity of 
 and , there exists an open ball around  such that for all  element 
of this open ball  and . But, since the 
overall industry rents are a concave function of labor inputs, this open ball must contain a pair of 
labor inputs  which yields higher overall industry rents. Since  is a feasible 
choice at , overall industry rents are greater at  than at . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 11: Suppose not. Thus there exists some interval over which the Pareto 
frontier is a convex function. Since by Lemma 6 the Pareto frontier is downwards sloping, this 
implies that there exists a tuple  with  and 
 such that
.
Rewriting this inequality, one obtains
. (11)
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Similar, one has
.
where the strict inequality follows from concavity of  in labor inputs and the weak 
inequality follows jointly from Lemma 5 and equation (1). The above two equations imply that 
 is a feasible choice. Concavity of the overall industry rents and equation (1), however, 
imply that
(12)
Since, by the definition of the Pareto frontier,
,
equation (12) contradicts equation (11). Q.E.D.
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